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Simonton: Observations on Covenants for Title

OBSERVATIONS ON COVENANTS FOR TITLE
JAMES W. SIMONTON*

Under the feudal system, the usual method of conveying

a present freehold estate in land was by feoffment. Such
a feoffment was usually attended by an implied warranty.'
This warranty is said to have arisen from the obligation of
the feudal lord to protect the holding of his tenant and
was in the nature of a "covenant real" in that for its
breach, the courts awarded to the warrantee a judgment
against the original warrantor, or his heirs, for lands of
equal value to those which the warrantee had lost.2 References to such warranties are to be found in some of the
older Virginia cases, though often not very intelligible. 3
In 1536 the Statute of Uses was passed, and following this
there came into use methods of conveying real estate which
operated under this statute, and conveyance by feoffment
and by the other old common law conveyances with attendant implied warranties fell into disuse. It soon became
settled law that in conveyances under the Statute of Uses,
no covenants are implied, hence if the title of the grantor
proved defective, the grantee or his assigns in absence of4
fraud or deceit would have no remedy against the grantor.
There accordingly grew up the habit of inserting personal
covenants in conveyances, for the purpose of giving the
grantee or his assigns, a remedy against the grantor in
case of defect in or failure of the title.5 These covenants,
doubtless, were at first expressed in various ways, but eventually there were developed five reasonably definite covenants, which were frequently used, and which came to be
known as covenants for title. Even today one may seemingly invent new covenants for title if he chooses. The five
covenants are the covenants of (1) seisin, (2) right to convey, (3) against incumbrances, (4) for further assurance,
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
I WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY. (23d ed.) 39, 647; RAWLE, COVENANTS NOR T %E, (5th

ed.) §§ 2 and 3.

2 RAW/LE, COVENANTS FOR Tn'TE (5th ed.) § 2; REEvEs, REAL PROPERTY, § 1149; TiFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY (2d ed.) § 1675.
3 Threlkelds v. Fitzhugh, 2 Leigh. 451 (1830) ; Stout v. Jackson, 2 Rand. 132

(1823).
15 C. J. § 1212.
I

RAWLE,

COVENANTS Foa TITLE (5th ed.)

§ 13.
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(5) for quiet enjoyment. 6 On this side of the Atlantic a
sixth covenant, the modern covenant of warranty was de-

veloped, 7 which in scope and effect was similar to the covenant of quiet enjoyment and

practically

superseded

it.

These covenants are 'the ones still commonly used, and
their construction and effect have been fairly well settled.

Sometimes all six are inserted in a deed though as to scope
and effect there is little difference between the first two
and the last two. 8 If the second, third, ifourth and sixth be
used in a deed the grantee and his assigns will get about

all the protection that our none too perfect law permits.
Perhaps there is no way in which he can have complete
protection.9
The rule that one conveying land by deed is liable only
if he makes express covenants, arose during the sixteenth
century, and has persisted to the present. The law of sales
of personal property started on the same road, 10 but being
less bound by the rigidity which has always characterized
real estate law, a more modern doctrine came into being in

the law of sales. Where one sells a chattel as owner the
law implies that he warrants the title to the chattel, and if
title proves bad, the purchaser may recover for breach of
the implied warranty." The seller represented he had the

right to sell the chattel and the buyer paid his money with
the expectation of getting the ownership of the chattel.
12
This reasonable expectation is recognized by the law.
Where the vendor represents he has the right to convey real
estate in fee and the buyer pays his money, he too ought
to have his reasonable expectation that he is to have good
62
112.

LOMAX'S DIGEST, 263; REEVES, REAL PROPERTY, § 1143.
7 2 LOMAX'S DIGEST, 264, 273-276. RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE (5th ed.)

§§

110-

a These covenants for title may be either general or special. They are said to be
general when they extend to claims of all persons whomsoever; they are Bald to be
special when restricted to the acts of grantor and those claiming under him. But as
a matter of fact it would seem a covenant would be special if it was not general, but
covered any part of the ground covered by a general covenant and that the term
"limited" would be a better term than the term "special." Thus in Miller v. Bayless,
104 Mo. 630, 92 S. W. 482 (1906) where the grantor warranted against all claims of
himself or of those under whom he claimed the covenant was properly held not to be
general though much broader than most special covenants.
9 At the most the damages will be limited by the amount of the compensation the
covenanter received. In general he will be held only to the extent of this sum plus In.
terest and costs.
10 "If I take the horse of another man, and sell him, and the owner takes him
again, I may have an action of debt for the money: for the bargain was perfect by
the delivery of the horse; and caveat emptor." NoY's MAXIMS, C. 42.
'AWIrLLisToN, SALES, § 218; Byrnside v. Burdett, 16 W. Va. 702 (1879) ; Jarrett v.
Goodnow, 39 W. Va. 602, 20 S. E. 575 (1894).
" "The possession of the vendor of chattels is equivalent to an affirmation of title.
And in such case the vendor is to be held to an implied warranty; though nothing be
said on the subject between the parties.'" Byrnside v. Burdett, 15 W. Va. 702 at '118.
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title recognized by the law and a remedy against the seller if
the title be defective. Since land is immovable, it is

reasonable that the sellers' warranty of title protect the
assigns of the grantee as well as the grantee himself.

Yet

the vendor is not liable at all except to the extent he has
bound himself by express covenant. 13 If he is able to get
the money of some trusting person and give in return a
deed to property with defective title he can say he is entirely within the law. Doubtless any proposition to change

the law of conveyancing so as to confirm with the moral
principles back of the modern law of sales, would meet

with vigorous protests from many practitioners, yet their
chief argument would be that what has been the law for

five hundred years is sacred.

Few of said practitioners

would consent to go about their daily affairs in the dress

of fifty years ago, though they have been known to defend
a rule of law as far removed from the customs and ways

of thinking of our times as are the customs and modes of
thought of the time of the Tudors and Stuarts in which

such rule of law had its origin.

The modern thing would

be a statute providing for the implication of full covenants

in every deed purporting to convey as owner, a freehold
for value, unless the grantor should by express language

impose limitations, thus throwing on the vendor the burden
of expressing limitations on the covenants which his
grantees in all fairness have a reasonable right to expect.

It is not the purpose of this paper to urge the enactment
of such a statute, but to point out the fact that the custom

in this state is to convey with covenant of warranty only,14
13 A covenant of quiet enjoyment is usually implied in every lease where there are
no express covenants for title TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 125-6. Also on assignnient
of a lease there is authority that the warrahty implied on sale of chattels protects the
assignee.
TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, 965-6.
4
How this custom of giving a deed with, only general warranty started one cannot say. RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE, 31, says that formerly in England where vne
was conveying his own title in fee the purchaser had a right only to a covenant
against the seller's own acts. Perhaps the courts in Virginia believed they were liberal
in extending this to a general warranty instead of a special one. There is little
authority to the effect that if a contract to convey land is silent the vendee is entitled to a deed with general warranty only. In 2 Lom&Ax's DIGEST 262 it is stated that
the Virginia courts are uncertain but that the practice was to convey with general
warranty. In II MINOW'S INST. 725 it is stated that in Virginia the vendor usually
enters into covenants of general warranty, citing Rucker v. Lowther, 6 Leigh 269
(1835), which case seems to sustain the statement. And in Tavenner v. Barrett, 21
W. Va. 656 at 681 (1883) the court said, "The undisputed law is that as a general
rule upon an agreement for the sale of land the vendor, though nothing be said in the
contract on the subject, is considered as contracting for a general warranty."
But
in these cases the whole argument seems to have been that the vendor was not required
to give this much and doubtless the courts believed they were being liberal. According
to modern ideas more than a general warranty ought to be required in such a case for
one who claims the right to convey land as owner and collect the price ought to be
held liable if his represented title proves defective.
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and that the lawyer who is satisfied with this has failed to
provide his client with the protection which the law permits.
To the lay mind doubtless the "general warrantee deed"
has a mysterious and reassuring sound-and is a magic
thing designed to protect the buyer from all evils. We can
only speculate as to how the custom of giving only a covenant of warranty, instead of full covenants happened to be
established, but it is submitted that the lawyer representing the vendee ought to see that his client has more protection than the general warranty gives. As stated above
the use of the covenants of seisin, against incumbrances and
for further assurance in addition to that of warranty is essential to give the measure of protection which the law
permits. The grantor, having gotten the money for the
land, if title fails ought to make good to the grantee or his
assigns the harm suffered. As the law stands the full extent of such liability is not imposed on the grantor even
though he makes all of the ordinary covenants for title.
How far the law goes is briefly stated below.
The covenant of right to convey is broader than the covenant of seisin, 5 because the grantor may have power to
convey land of which he is not seised, yet for all practical
purposes in this state the covenant of seisin is sufficient, for
powers to appoint are rare, and even if the grantor has not
the seisin but has power to convey the land in fee, there
would be no more than a technical breach of the covenant
of seisin. Hence the covenant of seisin alone will be discussed hereafter, and no further reference will be made to
the covenant of right to convey.
The covenant of seisin is broken at once, if at all, and
if broken, it becomes a chose in action on which the covenantee may bring suit immediately, and upon which the
statute of limitations begins to run.'0 If the covenant is
broken and the covenantee conveys the land without suing on the covenant, the grantee acquires no right to enforce it because the deed does not purport to assign this
chose in action. It is said that a broken covenant does not
run with the land. After the covenantee has conveyed the

Is See

RAWLE, COVENANTS FOn TrrLE (6th ed.) 82-84.
1 From the form of the language the covenant seems broken at once. It has been
so regarded generally except for certain attempts to make it into a covenant running
with the land. In Virginia and presumably in West Virginia the covenant Is a covenant in praesenti and broken at once. See Kinzie v. Riely's Ex'r., 100 W. Va. 709, 42 S. E.
872 (1902) ; Building Light & Water Co. w. Fray, 96 Va. 559, 32 S. E. 58 (1899).
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land, he cannot recover substantial damages on this chose
in action unless he is able to sue and recover as an
assignee. 17 The covenant of seisin is valuable, in that it
enables the covenantee to bring suit at once, without waiting for a disturbance of possession or an ouster. If the
land at the time of the conveyance is in possession of one
having paramount title, the covenantee may recover as
damages the amount of the consideration, plus interest and
costs. The covenant of warranty has been extended by
the doctrine of constructive eviction, 8 so as to enable the
covenantee to recover the same amount of damages on it in
such a case, so in this sort of case the covenant of seisin
gives no remedy-beyond what the covenantee could have
under a covenant of warranty. If possession of the land
pass but the covenantor had no title, suit may be started
at once on the covenant of seisin, but in this case the covenantee ought to surrender the possession of the land and
having done so should recover the consideration paid with
interest and costs. 9 Here the covenant of seisin would
give an advantage the covenantee would not have under
the covenant of warranty, for under the latter there would
be no breach until ouster under paramount title. Should
the covenantee convey the land before starting suit then,
as pointed out above, he could recover only nominal damages unless possibly where he conveyed with covenants and
his grantee recovered from him, in which case he might
recover indemnity from the covenantor. In such case he
might sue on the covenant of seisin, and, if his grantee had
been ousted from possession he could also sue on the covenant of warranty. If the covenantor had no title and the
land was vacant, it would seem that this would not constitute a breach of the covenant of warranty since there would
be no ouster, though the covenantee would be free to take
possession if he chose. The covenant of warranty would
be broken only in case he took possession and was then
ousted. But if there were a covenant of seisin the cove17RAWLE, COVENANTS Fos TiT=

(5th ed.) 336-7.
1 Rex v. Creel, 22 W. Va. 873 (1883); McConaughey & Co. v. Bennett's Executors, 50 W. Va. 172 (1901) ; Ifsley v. Wilson, 42 W. Va. 757 (1896) ; Smith v. Parsons,
33 W. Va. 644, 11 S. E. 68 (1890).
11 It has been held that after the covenantee has recovered the purchase money title
is considered as revested in the covenantor; Porter v. Hill, 9 Mass. 36 (1812) ; Stinson
v. Sumner, 9 Mass. 150 (1812). Such title must revest by operation, or such title or
possession as the coveriantor had. But it would seem the covenantee could tender a
reconveyance at the time of the suit. See RAWLE, COVENANTS FORT=TL (6th ed.) 263.
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nantee could have immediate recovery of the consideration
on proof paramount title was -outstanding. Here again the
covenant of seisin would give the covenantee an advantage
he would not have under a general warranty.
The covenant against incumbrances, like the covenant
of seisin, is%a covenant in preasenti and broken as soon as
made, for either the land is then incumbered or it
is not, and if it is incumbered, then there is breach of the
covenant. 20 Some incumbrances such as trust deeds may
constitute breach of the covenant of seisin as well as of the
covenant against incumbrances, but the existence of many
incumbrances such as profits, easements, inchoate dower1
2
rights, do not constitute a breach of the covenant of seisin.
Hence the covenant against incumbrances and the covenant
of seisin supplement each other, though some kinds of outstanding incumbrances may constitute a breach of both
covenants. If there be an incumbrance in the form -of a
lien for a sum of money, the covenantee may sue at once,
but can recover nominal damages only or wait until the
money is due and remove the incumbrance by payment and
then re~over his damages.2 2 If the incumbrance is in the
form of. a profit -or an easement, he may sue at once and
recover as damages the amount such incumbrance lessens
the value of the land, 23 for such incumbrances cannot usually be removed at all, and of course no action will lie on
the covenant of warranty because of an incumbrance unless
it is enforced so that there is ouster or at least a disturbance of possession. An inchoate dower right also cannot be
removed by payment and hence is held to fall within the
same rule. 24

If the dower right vests and is then enforced,

this constitutes a breach -of the covenant of warranty and
20Marbury v. Thornton, 82 Va. 702, 1 S. E. 909 (188G); Smith v. White, 71 W.
Va. 639, 78 S. E. 378 (1913).
2&RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE (5th ed.) 72-75. The meaning of the term "incumbrance" is by no means clear. It certainly does cover a very broad range however.
But it is also clear that very many of these incumbrances do not affect the techpical
sei3in.
2 It may be noted that sometimes instead of covenanting the premises are "free
from all incumbrances" there is a covenint for quiet enjoyment "free and clear of all
incumbrances." Where thus following a covenant for quiet enjoyment It is regarded
as a covenant in futuro and runs with the land. See the effect of this In c. 72, § 17
of the W. VA.

CODE.

7 Since the covenant is broken at once suit may be maintained but the courts
have refused to permit the plaintiff to recover more than nominal damages until hs
baa. removed the incumbrance, though he may start suit and remove the Incumbrances at
any time before trial and judgment. See 15 C. J. 1326-8.
" See 15 C. J. 1328-9; RAWLE, COVENANTS
Fo TITLE, 273-5.
21 Whisler v. Hicks, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 100 (1839) ; Harrington v. Murphy, 109
Mass. 299 (1872) ; Walker v. Deavor, 79 Mo. 664 (1883).
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there is a remedy on that covenant, and there is also a remedy on the covenant against incumbrances, but if the suit
on the latter covenant is delayed over ten years from the

making of the covenant, then this right to sue will be
barred by the statute of limitations. 5 If the covenantee
conveys the land as if unincumbered, before bringing suit,
then he can recover only nominal damages for breach of

this covenant unless his grantee is able to hold him on covenants and does so.

It is to be noted that the covenant

against incumbrances is even more valuable than the covenant of seisin in giving rights not enjoyed under a general

warranty. The existence of an incumbrance is not a breach
of the covenant of warranty but there must be a disturb-

ance of possession or an ouster, and in case of a mere disturbance of possession under an easement, there is doubt
as to what damages if any can be recovered under the general warranty.2 6 There are cases both in Virginia and in
West Virginia which illustrate the danger of using only the
general warranty and great advantage the covenant of

seisin and the covenant against incumbrance may give the
27

covenantee.
The full covenants for title are so adapted as to give to
the covenantee and his assigns a remedy on some one of
the covenants in nearly every case where a remedy is

needed.

Some covenants run with the land and some do

not, but there is usually at least one available to sue upon

if title proves defective.

Since it has been said that the in-

tent of the parties is that all covenants for title be for the

benefit of both the covenantee and his assigns, some courts
have tried to make the covenant of seisin and the covenant

against incumbrances run with the land in order to effectu"S W. VA. CODE, ch. 104, § 6.
2,3 The rule there must be an eviction under paramount title to constitute a breach
of the covenant of warranty is too narrow, and courts have been compelled to extend
the meaning of the term eviction in order to reach a reasonable result. The whole doctrine of "constructive eviction" has grown up because the rule did not fit the cases.
A disturbance of possession under a valid easement is certainly not an eviction yet it
has been held so by many tcourts and if we are to cling to this old rule, these courts
have acted properly. See 15 C. J. 1292 for cases. Probably this difficulty would
have been partially avoided had the covenant of quiet enjoyment been retained in general use instead of the covenant of warranty.
" In Smith v. White, 71 W. Va. 639 (1913), the plaintiff fortunately had a covenant against incumbrances in addition to that of warranty and was able to recover
on the former, but in Cummings v. Hamrick, 74 W. Va. 406, 82 S. E. 44 (1914), the
covenantee, though there were outstanding incumbrances, was compelled to pay the
price and was unable to have a set off because there had been no disturbance of possession. In Savage v. Cauthorn, 109 Va. 694 (1909), and Jones v. Richmond, 88 Va.
231, 13 S. E. 414 (1891). the respective covenantees unfortunately had only general warranties. In the latter the -ovenantee had actually paid $500 toward the removal of
incumbrances but could not recover on the covenant because there had been no ouster.
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ate this supposed intent of the parties. 28 But this at once
raises the question as to whether, if these covenants run
with the land, they can still be considered as broken at
once, or whether they become covenants which are broken
only by ouster under paramount title or its equivalent. If
the latter view is taken then what has happened is that the
covenant of seisin and that against incumbrances are in
substance made into a covenant of general warranty. If
they are considered as broken at once and at the same time
as running with the land then one soon becomes involved in
difficulties and inconsistencies. Since the general warranty
is almost always used in this state there would be no advantage to the covenantee in making the two covenants
into another covenant of warranty. Their present advantage, if any, is that they give immediate remedies in cases
where there is none on the general warranty. Making
these covenants run with the land would inject more uncertainty and complication into the law as to covenants for
title.
The covenant for further assurance runs with the land
and it is the only one of the covenants for title which is
specifically enforceable in equity.29 By this covenant the
grantor binds himself on demand by the grantee or his
assigns to make any other necessary conveyance or assurance which will aid in perfecting the title of the covenantee
or his assigns. There is a breach only where the additional
conveyance is demanded and refused. This covenant though
once of much importance in England, never has had great
importance in this state. Conveyances today are seldom so
defective that another conveyance is required, and if so,
there is usually another remedy. However, the covenant
may prove of value in some cases. For example, if the
grantor had no title when he conveyed, and later acquired
good title, the grantee or his assignee could, under a covenant for further assurance demand a new deed and if re' The doctrine started with the case of Kingdon v. Notile, 1 M. & S. 855 (1818),
4 M. & S. 53 (1815) where the English court held the covenant of seain broken at
once but that it was a technical continuing breach and that the assignee of the covenantee could sue when they had suffered substantial damages. Later in Spoor v.
Green, L. R. 9 Ex., 99 (1874) it was held the statute of limitations ran from the
time of the making of the covenant. The result is somewhat wlerd. In Missouri It
had been held the covenant runs with the land and no suit can be maintained till eub.
stantial damages have been incurred, and the same is held as to the covenant against
incumbrances. But this nlerely makes another covenant of warranty out of the
covenant of seisin and against incumbrances.
" RAWLE, OOVENANTg FoR TITLE (5th"ed.) 129.
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fused could file bill -for specific performance. The recording of the new deed would prevent conveyance by the grantor
to a purchaser for value without notice or the acquisition of
a lien by a creditor, which under the recording act, would
Ierely starting the suit
take priority over the first deed. M
for specific performance would enable the covenantee to
protect himself by recording a li pendens notice. But the
omission of this covenant from the conveyance in this state
is usually a matter of no great moment, yet a careful lawyer will insert it.
The covenant of warranty has come to be the principal
covenant for title in this country, and it is usually the only
covenant -found in deeds in this state.30 Where it is the only
covenant, how complete is the protection it gives to the
covenantee and his assigns? It has probably come to be the
law in this state that where the seller contracts to convey
land in fee simple without mention of covenants, he is impliedly bound to convey by a deed with general warranty
and no more.3 ' At least this seems to be well settled custom. It is certain the covenant does give a considerable
degree of protection but it is also certain it does not give
all the protection which the law permits to the covenantee
and his assigns.32 Like the covenant for further assurance,
this covenant runs with the land. It is capable of more
than one breach, though of course a total eviction from the
land by one with paramount title constitutes final breach
of the covenant. It is usually said that this covenant is
broken only by an ouster by one having paramount title
and that the action accrues to the one holding the land at
that time. But it has been held to be broken by a disturbance of the possession which does not amount to an ouster.33
Such disturbance may occur under an easement or a profit.
But whether full damages can be recovered after a mere
disturbance of possession is not clear. Certainly the cove" "The covenant of warranty is almost universally the only covenant resorted to
under our system of conveyancing." Staples, J., in Burtners v. Keran, 24 Gratt. 42
at 64 (1873).
See n. 14, supra.
" The effectiveness of the covenant has been hampered by certain technical rules
chief among which is the rule that to constitute a breach there must be an eviction.
Courts have invented constructive eviction and have in the case of disturbance of possession under easements found evictions where none actually happened but the rule still occasionally proves potent enough to prevent a result. For examples, see the cases cited
Another technical rule is that there must be some interest in land
in n. 27, sup-r
passed with which the covenant may run. The limitations brought about by this are
discussed hereafter in this paper.
" See n. 26, supra.
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nant against incumbrances would be more effective in such
a case. The covenant of general warranty proved ineffective on one Virginia case in which the covenantee had actually contributed $500 towards paying off a valid incumbrance, because of the technical rule that there is no breach
of the covenant of warranty until there has been an ouster.84
Yet the courts did extend this rule where the possession
and the title were both outstanding at the time the covenant was made, so that the covenantee found the true owners in possession under paramount title. Here the courts
held there was a "constructive eviction" resulting in a total
breach of the covenant and therefore the covenantee could
sue at once. 35 In such a case if the covenantee did not try
to take possession but at once conveyed for value to another, presumably the chose in action would not pass and by
the conveyance and the assignee could have no remedy. 8"
This situation will be discussed later in the paper. It may
be said that if possession of the land or if some other sort
of defective title passes by the conveyance then this covenant is not broken at once, and it will thereafter be broken
only by a disturbance of possession or by an ouster by one
having a paramont right. It follows that the covenantee
or his assignee must adopt a policy of watchful waiting. He
can do nothing until the paramount owner has chosen to
enforce his right.3 7 The covenant of seisin and the covenant
against incumbrances would be of great value here if there
were actually an outstanding paramount right, but since
they do not run they would be useless to an assignee of the
covenantee unless some means is found of giving the assignee the benefit of the chose in action, but as will be
pointed out hereafter the courts could quite easily do this.
One sort of situation arises where none of the covenants
for title as usually construed, give a remedy. Suppose A
deeds vacant land to which he has no title, for value, to B

11

See Jones v. Richmond, 88 Va. 231, 13 S. E. 414 (1891).
" Rex v. Creel, 22 W. Va. 373 (1883) ; Smith v. Parsons, 33 W. Va. 644, 11 5
E. 68 (1890); McConaughey & Co. v. Bennett's Exrs., 50 W. Va. 172, 40 S. E. 640
(1901) ; Ilsley v. Wilson, 42 W. ya. 757, 26 S. E. 551 (1806) ; Butcher v. Peterson, 26
W. Va. 447, 26 S. E. 551 (1885).
3,Since the breach of the covenant is final and complete on delivery of the deed
containing it, it would logically follow that nothing would pass by conveyance by the covenantee, unless the courts would hold the conveyance bad the effect of an assignment of the
chose in action. As stated later in connection with the covenant of selsin the writer
believes this should be done because the covenantee, having no land to pass, ought to
be held to pass all the interest he has, namely the chose in action.
Unless in some cases he is able to file a bill to remove cloud in title-but this
would seem very bad legal tactics. It would be very costly and he would have to suffer defeat before he could maintain action for breach of the covenant of warranty.
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with covenants of seisin and of warranty, for a consideration of $1000. Here B could sue on the covenant of seisin
at once but presumably not on the covenant of warranty
since there is not even a constructive eviction. If B without
discovering the state of the title and without taking possession conveys for a consideration of $1000 to C, the latter
has no remedy on A's covenant of seisin. Furthermore, he
can have none on A's covenant of warranty because it is
a covenant which is said to run with the land, and, it is
reasoned, unless some estate or interest in the land passes
from B to C, there is nothing to carry to covenant. It is
generally held in this country that possession is a sufficient
estate or interest in land to carry covenants running with
the land, 38 but in the case under consideration there is no
actual possession, and the constructive possession is in the
one who has valid legal title. The phrase "running with
the land" is used only as a formula or solving phrase by
the courts. 39 No distinction can be made in reason between
a case where we say an estate passes, and one in which we
say no estate passes. The plain intent of the parties is to
protect the covenantee and his assigns in all cases, if the
title proves defective, yet protection is denied here merely
because we say there is nothing with which the covenant
can run.40 Furthermore, in so far as the covenant of warranty is concerned, the technical rule that there is no breach
until there has been an ouster would prevent a cause of action arising here even though we could get around the
difficulty that there is no interest in land passes with which
the covenant can run.41 The result is we hold A liable if he
has not been too bad and had at least possession of the land
to convey, but if he has neither possession nor any fragment
of the title and has conveyed with covenant of warranty
only, then A is safe though he has the $1000 paid by B,
which in all fairness C ought to have. A is unjustly enriched

ts In England

it was even held that a wrongful possession was not sufficient.

See

Andrew v. Pierce, 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 158 (1805).
But many courts in this country
have held a possession, even though wrongful, is a sufficient estate with which the
covenant may run. The leading case is Beddoe's Ex'tr v. Wadsworth, 21 Wend. 120
(1839).
Ses Dickenson v. Hoomes, 8 Gratt. 353 (1852) in accord.
" Lawyers tend to regard title to land as an entity or as a thing and think of this
thing or some part of it actually passing from covenantor to covenantee and from covenantee to his assignee, and the covenant as in somiei way attached to this thing. Tlhe
thing is imaginary.
11 The fact that the covenantor had not even a wrongful possession and totally lacked
title is all the more reason why he ought to be held liable on his covenant.
J The technical rule requiring an eviction has hampered the granting of relief in

some classes of cases.

See n. 32, supra.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1928

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [1928], Art. 4
WEST FIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

at the expense of C but he is legally enriched, though morally little can be urged in his favor. But had B taken possession of the vacant land the day before he conveyed to C,
then presumably C would have a remedy on the covenant
of warranty if ousted from the possession by paramount
title, though when A conveyed to B the latter had no remedy and could have none unless he first took possession and
was then ousted. Had C taken possession after he got his
deed from B he clearly would be without remedy. The
difficulty in reaching a just result lies in the phrase "running with the land."4 2 Courts and lawyers are prone to
treat title as a thing, as an entity, whereas it is nothing but
a person's fact relations toward the land or the thing. Being a bundle of rights, powers and privileges title is entirely
intangible and one may not be able to guess in the case
above, whether A had some one or more of these rights,
powers and privileges which a covenant may run, until a
court of last resort passes on the matter. Then for the first
time we can certainly say the covenant of warranty can or
cannot run to C. The notion of a covenant running with the
land probably came from transactions such as leases where
there was a tenure relation between the grantor and the
grantee and the idea was carried over into Ifee simple conveyances where such relation was wholly lacking since no
tenure relation existed. Here the notion arose that it was
the interest in the land passing by the conveyance which
carried the covenant, a wholly artificial rule, the sole virtue of which is that it permits the assignee to have the benefit of the covenant in most of the situations which arise.
Title to land is merely the relation of one toward land. If
he bears certain fact relations toward certain land we, say
he has fee simple title, and by deed he may transfer these
fact relations to another. If he has no such fact relation to
the land, his effort to transfer to another fails, yet by his
fee simple deed he purports to transfer such a factrelationship as will constitute title in fee. The running of
the covenant to the benefit of assigns is made to depend not
on intent of the parties or on what the covenantor purported to be able to do, but on the accident of whether or not
" Why should not the covenant pass to the assignee with the deed to him? Why
is it essential the deed have at least a slight effect as to transferring title? When
analyzed the phrase "running with the land" seems to have little to It.
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he had at least a fragment of the fact-relations toward the
land which he represented he had, mere possession, though
wrongful, or any other fragment being sufficient. The
mere fact that C gets no shred of title43 ought not to deprive
him of his remedy on the covenant made expressly for his
benefit at the time he most needs a remedy. C ought to
have the benefit of the covenant and this should dispose the
courts to stretch artificial rules which bind the matter in
wherever they can see a clear way to do so. If the courts
cling to the orthodox idea of covenants running with the
land, as they probably will, there is little to be hoped for
from the covenant of warranty so far as C is concerned. It
is true that some courts have held in such a case, that A is
estopped by his deed to deny an estate in the land passed
to B and from him to C, when sued by C for breach of the
covenant of warranty.44 The difficulty with this is that C
must allege in his declaration and prove at the trial the
very facts A would be estopped to deny. It is hard to see
how A can be estopped when all he has to do is point to
C's own pleadings and proof. There is the further difficulty
that unless C enters on the land, and is evicted by paramount title he will be unable to prove a breach of the covenant at all. This seems a very undesirable method of handling such a case. Some courts have given C relief where
A's deed contained a covenant of seisin. This covenant being broken became a chose in action. Since choses in action are assignable it is held that by his deed to C, B assigned to C this chose in action. 45 The difficulty here is that
the deed purports to be a conveyance of land and not an
assignment of a personal chose in action, yet there are
some analogies in our law. For example, there are the
various applications of the principle that the mortgage is
incident to the debt, and the benefit of it passes on assignment of the debt though such assignment does not mention
the mortgage. A still better analogy has to do with pledges
If A pledges a chattel to B to secure a debt of $500, and B
wrongfully sells the chattel to C for full value, C believing B is the owner, C gets no title as against A, but he does
13 Yet if B is able to ket possession in some
manner before grant the "running
with the land" requirement would be met, but not if C succeeded in getting possession
after he got his deed.
" Solberg v. Robinson, 34 S. D. 55, 147 N. W. 87 (1914).
'5 Schofield
v. Iowa Homestead Co., 32 Ia. 317 (1871); Allen v. Kennedy, 91 Mo.
324, 2 S. W. 142 (1886); Kimball v. Bryant, 25 Minn. 496 (1879).
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get the right to the $500 debt which A owes B, and to secure which the article was pledged, this being the only interest B had in respect to this chattel. 46 So in the case of
the land, one may reason that all that B had in respect to
the land was the right to recover the price from A, and
since he tried to convey the land to C in fee, this conveyance ought to be held to pass to C the only interest B had,
namely, this chose in action, and therefore C as assignee of
B may enforce it against A. Note that B cannot enforce
this right himself for more than nominal damages, after he
has conveyed to C for a consideration of $1000, so why
should C not have iMi? Such a rule should work well in
this state where the statute of limitations on such a chose
in action is ten years. 47 C might well be expected to discover the state of affairs within that time.
In conclusion one may say that in this state, though it
seems the custom to give a deed with a general warranty
only, and it seems to be the law that if the contract for the
sale of land is silent on the subject, the purchaser is entitled
to a deed with general warranty only, this fails to give the
purchaser the protection he ought to have and that which
may be had under the law. Where the contract is silent on
the subject it would be only fair and proper to require the
seller to give a deed with full covenants, but it seems the
established law of the state is otherwise. But the attorney
for the buyer when his services are sought in time, ought
to see to it that the contract calls for a deed with full
covenants, and that his client gets a deed which contains
at least the covenant of seisin and against incumbrances,
in addition to the general warranty. Otherwise his client
may lose because of his attorney's negligence or ignorance,
as the case may be. Even with these covenants there may
arise at least one or two situations where the covenant of
seisin and against incumbrances will fail to give a remedy
unless the court when a case arises will hold that a deed
given by the covenantee to an assignee Ifor value amounts
to an assignment of existing causes of action for breach of
covenants for title. That the court may quite properly do
this has been argued above and with a long period of limi45 Talty v. Trust Co., 93 U. S. 321 (1876) ; Donald v. Suckling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 585
(1866) ; Williams v. Ashe, 111 Cal. 180, 43 Pac. 595 (1896) ; Bradley v. Parks, 83 1I1.
169 (1876).
" W. VA. CODE, ch. 104, § 6.
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tations such as we have, the assignee would have a reasonable opportunity to discover the state of the title and start
suit. If the covenant or his assignee failed to discover the
right within ten years certainly they are not entitled to
much sympathy. This would, in substance, have the effect
of making these covenants run with the land when this
48
seems desirable.
It is submitted that the bar of the state ought to be more
careful to see buyers are protected by more extensive covenants than are usually found in deeds in this state.
'3 In the proposed revised code the Revisors have inserted a section which makes
the covenant of seisin and against incumbrances run with the land. In the note it is
stated there is a conflict of authority on the point in the various states which is certainly true. But whether the new section is advisable in West Virginia is certainly
arguable. The covenant of warranty is in practically every deed that contains any covenant at all so there is always one great covenant which will run with the land. As
shown above the other two covenants are valuable because they may enable the covenantee to bring matters to a head and sue at once for the price paid the covenantor.
The new section would raise the question as to whether the two covenants in question
would be broken at once and at the same time run with the land, or whether they are
broken only vhefi substantial damages are suffered. If the latter view is taken then
they lose their chief value. If the former view is taken there would still be a doubt as
to whether the covenantee on discovering he has merely possession and no title (for
example) could bring suit at once. Besides the doctrine of a technical breach which is
a breach but still continues until substantial damages are suffered is a troublesome and
somewhat wierd conception. On the whole since the law in this state is as is and
since the customs of conveyancing are as they are, it would be better to omit the section making these two covenants run with the land.
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